Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington: As
Mixed Questions of Law and Fact,
Should Ordinances and Injunctions be
Reviewed Under the Madsen and Frisby
Standards of Review by Using a De
Novo Standard or a "Clearly
Erroneous" Standard?*
In Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, the Sixth Circuit used
a de novo scope of review and applied the new intermediate
standard of review, developed by the Supreme Court in Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, Inc., for content-neutral limits to methods
of protest. The author argues that appellate courts may narrow
their scope of review without risking any "chilling effect" on the
First Amendment. The dangers of systematic bias in state courts
that drove the Supreme Court to de novo review in civil rights and
First Amendment cases in the 1960s no longer exist. Furthermore,
judicial deference in these kinds of cases may be justified because
the antiabortion movement still has access to the political process,
the lack of which is a necessary precursor to any civil disobedience
in a just society, as defined by John Rawls in Theory of Justice.
Given a narrowed scope of review, the Sixth Circuit should have
remanded the case back to the district court for resolution under the
Madsen standard of review where the court could have developed
a more complete record with which to support-or modify-its
findings.

• I would like to thank Professor Charles Wiggins for his insight and support.
I dedicate this Note to my wife, Pat. Without her, IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The nature of a woman's right to a choice concerning access to
abortion may be the most divisive social issue of our time. Juxtaposing
the competing issues of free speech and protest on one hand, and the
right of targets of that protest to be left alone on the other, onto the
abortion debate merely adds fuel to the fire. Over the last decade, parts
of the pro-life movement, increasingly frustrated by a lack of progress
within the legislatures and the courts, 1 have taken to public protest.
Some groups, such as Operation Rescue, have targeted for extended
blockade specific clinics offering abortions.2 Groups have also targeted
the homes of doctors and other abortion providers. Violence, all of it
apparently stemming from elements within the pro-life movement, has
flared. 3 In response, many of these targeted clinics and doctors filed for
injunctive relief. 4 In addition, local and state legislative bodies have
enacted ordinances to help control, and in some cases outright ban,
protests in residential areas. 5 Inevitably, litigation ensued that has

I. Joseph Sobran, The Only Option Left? Paul Hill's Dilemma Led Him to a
Violent Act, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 4, 1994, at 13A. In this article, the author
comments on the disenfranchisement felt by many pro-life activists in the wake of the
I 992 Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (I 992):
[I]n 1992, came the day the pro-lifers had worked and waited for. And they
got the reward of Sisyphus. The court, almost all Republican appointees by
now, reaffirmed its arbitrary ruling in Roe, not on grounds that it was
constitutionally sound, but for the frank reason that the court's own prestige
was at stake. . . . This meant that the pro-life movement could achieve
nothing through the political process.
Sobran, supra.
2. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Limit On Protests at Abortion Clinic Reaches Top
Court, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1994, at Al3 (reporting that protests at a Melbourne,
Florida health clinic continued even while litigaton enused about injunctions against
certain types of protest. This litigation would later culminate in Madsen v. Women's
Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994); see infra analysis of Madsen in text accompanying
notes 105-33).
3. Laurie Goodstein & Pierre Thomas, Clinic Killings Follow Years of
Antiabortion Violence, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, I 995, at Al. The article quoted a
spokesperson from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms who stated that, of the
49 people prosecuted by the agency so far, "We found that all expressed antiabortion
views. There is nothing in our cases that would show it's providers or supporters of
abortion that are doing these acts." Id. at A8.
4. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993);
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. For a typical state court action, see Murray v. Lawson, 649
A.2d 1253 (N.J. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2264 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1987). For analysis of this case, see
infra text accompanying notes 92-104.
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resulted in at least four major Supreme Court decisions in this area since
1987, three of them in the last two years. 6
The stakes are very high. The antiabortion picketing cases mark the
first time in decades that the Court has systematically sanctioned limits
on the right to protest and dissent. 7 The ferocity of protests and the
increasing incidents of violence on one side,8 and the privacy rights of
targeted parties on the other,9 may well force a critical re-examination
of the role of protest and dissent in American society on a scale

6. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 488 (constitutionality of ordinance upheld in response to
a facial challenge); Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 (new standard of review for contentneutral injunctions against targeted protests); Bray, 506 U.S. at 263 (1993). In Bray, the
Court held that women seeking abortions are not a class within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985, thus, eliminating a major method for obtaining federal jurisdiction. Id. at 26674. This problem of obtaining federal jurisdiction has since been seemingly rectified by
passage of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act of I 994. However,
pro-life organizations have challenged the constitutionality of FACE and won in one
district court. But, the case was subsequently overturned, and similar suits have been
lost in six other district courts and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. For further
discussion of cases involving the constitutionality of FACE, see infra note 253. For
another cause of action that abortion rights advocacy groups have used to try to curb
antiabortion protest, see National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798
(1994) (allowing potential use of Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
Act in suing antiabortion protesters for damage to clinics).
7. The Red Scare cases of the 1920s and the I 950s contrast sharply with the
Court's approach today. But, in any comparison in this area, one must keep in mind that
because of the development of the First Amendment during the course of the twentieth
century, the Red Scare cases were decided on very different grounds. See, e.g., Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.");
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (the Smith Act, which prohibited
conspiracy to organize certain groups such as the Communist Party, was upheld as
constitutional based upon the application of the "clear and present danger" test to the
means used to control speech advocating the violent overthrow of the government). In
the I 960s, the Court generally expanded the right to protest. For a discussion of the
distinction between the approaches of the two eras, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARYL. REV. 189 (1983).
8. See, e.g., Goodstein & Thomas, supra note 3, at Al ("Militant antiabortion
activists have been waging a protracted campaign of violence against women's health
clinics and the people who work in them over the past decade, creating a climate of
terror Jong before a gunman opened fire last month at clinics in Massachusetts and
Virginia.").
9. For a detailed examination of the support for that right to privacy, see, for
example, Joy H. McMurtry & Patti S. Pennock, Ending The Violence: Applying the Ku
Klux Klan Act, RICO, and FACE to the Abortion Controversy, 30 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 203 (I 995).
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unprecedented smce the civil rights and antiwar protest days of the
l 960s. 10

The Court, in Madsen v. Womens Health Center, Inc., established
standards for the lower courts to use in fashioning content-neutral limits
to methods of protest. 11 Honoring these limits may do much to prevent
our social fabric from tearing further than it has to date 12 by acting as
a deterrent to future violence and social unrest. To do so meaningfully,
the lower courts must administer these limits with fairness and certainty.13 At this point in the struggle over abortion, the courts are acting
much like a referee in a prizefight where the boxers are locked up with
each other. The risk of illegal blows and "rabbit punches" runs high.
The referee must separate the fighters. The courts, to act as effective
referees, must have the tools and the ability to apply them with timely
certainty.
Appellate courts can potentially play a significant role by assisting the
trial courts in their role. They can help ensure that enforcement is more
timely by limiting the scope of their review of injunctions that are issued
by federal district court judges to restrain violent protest. Traditionally,
the Supreme Court has conducted an "independent review" of First
Amendment cases; ostensibly to avoid the risk of a "chilling effect" on
free speech. 14 But, that "chilling effect" is minimized in cases where
federal court judges properly invoke content-neutral injunctions to curb
disruptive or violent protests. Thus, appellate courts may be able to
routinely apply a "clearly erroneous" standard or an "abuse of discretion" standard and greatly speed up the enforcement of injunctions. 15

l 0. Signs abound that this debate is already underway. On the side of limits, see
id. For warnings of the dangers of limits, see Richard Stith, A Pro-Life Strategy, WASH.
POST, Dec. 2, I 994, at A31 (interpreting Madsen as enjoining sidewalk counselling,
which cuts off pro-lifers' hopes to work within the system nonviolently); Bruce
Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 67 (1990).
11. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994). See infra text accompanying notes 105-33.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 205-31 for discussion of John Rawls's
theory that in a reasonably just society, one's duty to obey the law may well override
one's right to resist injustice, when, under certain conditions, the two conflict.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 232-40.
14. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 51 l
(1984). Yet, the Court also commented that "[t]he requirement that special deference
be given to a trial judge's credibility determinations is itself a recognition of the broader
proposition that the presumption of correctness that attaches to factual findings is
stronger in some cases than in others." Id. at 500. See infra text accompanying notes
43-55.
15. Evan Lee concludes that appellate courts should apply a "clearly erroneous"
standard to the review of mixed questions of law and fact in those cases where it is not
creating "meaningful precedent." See Evan T. Lee, Principled Decision Making and the
Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L.

456

[VOL. 33: 453, 1996]

Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

A number of factors mitigate the risk of a "chilling effect" 16 in this
area: the now relatively settled state of the case law; 17 the passage of
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act of 1994, 18
which guarantees federal jurisdiction; and a lack of systemic bias against
one class of parties versus others within the federal court system. 19
The context for this proposed reduction in the scope of appellate review
is Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, a case recently decided by the
Sixth Circuit that overturned an ordinance banning residential picketing.20 The court used the new Madsen standard of review and lifted
the district court's preliminary injunction, which regulated protests
targeted at clinics and individuals. 21 Rather than aggressively reviewing cases in the manner that the Sixth Circuit did in Vittitow, appellate
courts may, in the wake of Madsen, allow the district courts to manage
enforcement with less interference. This policy would make enforcement more certain and more equitable to all parties, contributing to the
deterrent effect of the injunctions and working towards the ultimate goal

REV. 235, 285 (1991). Lee defines "meaningful precedent" as "a decision that the
appellate judge believes some future court will find to control the case before it." Id.
at 285 n.276. As will be discussed, the relatively settled state of the case law in the
wake of Madsen will decrease the probability that an appellate court will be forced to
review every case de novo. See infra text accompanying notes 254-55.
16. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 923 n.67 (1982)
(overturning a Mississippi state court imposed injunction against a violence-tinged
boycott that occurred in the context of desegregation in the 1960s). See infra text
accompanying notes 183-95.
17. The Court's decision in Frisby may have left the state of the law unsettled
concerning enforcement of ordinances. However, the standard of review developed in
Madsen may well have rectified that shortcoming. See infra text accompanying notes
93-104.
18. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (West 1994). Based upon its commerce power, Congress
enacted a law guaranteeing access to women's health clinics. In support of the Act,
Congress made legislative findings that violence, threats of force, and physical
obstructions aimed at persons seeking reproductive health services affected interstate
commerce. The Act provides for criminal and civil penalties. Just as importantly, it
also provides for a federal question cause of action for those seeking an injunction
against demonstrators. However, pro-life organizations have attacked the Act's
constitutionality, albeit unsuccessfully. See infra note 253.
I 9. See infra text accompanying notes 56-85. Evan Lee advanced this proposition
in support of his argument to limit the scope of appellate review in mixed questions
cases where the appellate court is not creating meaningful precedent. See also Lee,
supra note 15.
20. 43 F.3d I 100 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2276 (1995).
21. Id. at 1104.
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of ameliorating a climate that is currently breeding increasing levels of
violence.
II.

SCOPE OF REVIEW: THE PROBLEM OF ALLOCATION OF ROLES
BETWEEN THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS

The right to appeal in the United States is virtually universal. 22 Yet,
"[r]arely have commentators sought to justify why at least one appeal
should be available in every case."23 The position of the American Bar
Association's Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration,
which supports a standard mandating appeal of right, typifies the
summary nature of the reasoning: "The right of appeal, while never held
to be within the Due Process guaranty of the United States Constitution,
is a fundamental element of procedural fairness as generally understood
in this country." 24 But, other reasons for appellate review may be
found.
In that regard, the appellate courts must, as their primary function,
review the application of the rule oflaw made at the trial level for errors
in the law used, the application of the law, or, under certain circumstances, the factual findings. 25 The distinction between fact and law has
historically governed the intensity of that review. 26 At the simplest
level the trial court has authority over findings of fact because it has the
"keener eye for the mien of an untruthful witness than do[es its]
appellate siblings."27 The trier of fact has the opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witness, not merely review a written record. Also,
the trial judge has considerable latitude in determining what evidence the
trier of fact hears. 28
The appellate courts, by contrast, decide questions of pure law because
they are "arguably ... in the best position to determine whether, where,

22. Harlon L. Dalton, Taking the Right To Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95
YALE L.J. 62 (I 985).
23. Id. at 66.
24. Id. (quoting ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION:
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS§ 3.10, at 12 (1977)).
25. Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between

the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury
Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993 (1986).
26. Id. at 993, 1000-02.
27. Lee, supra note 15, at 260.
28. The trial court has a superior vantage point for weighing evidence against
witness credibility. Id. The trial court can also call witnesses itself, decide questions
of relevance, authenticity, and a myriad other issues that the appellate court can only
review. See generally FED. R. Evrn. 401, 403, 901-03; CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES (2d ed. 1993).
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when and how the law is in need of clarification or revision." 29 The
distinction of law and fact and the concomitantly differing roles of the
two levels of courts represent only two arbitrary positions on a
"continuum of experience" 30 that meets in a muddied middle, suggesting an ambivalence about who ought to make the primary decisions. At
one extreme, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) allow
appellate courts to overturn findings of fact only if they are "clearly
erroneous." 31 This 1985 addition to the Rules codified the long-held
rule "that fact-finding is the special province of the trial level." 32 The
trial courts exercise discretionary power in fact-finding and application
of the law to the facts "as defined by and within the limits set by
law."33 The appellate courts reserve declaration of law to themselves.34
The distinction between law and fact would appear to provide a nice
dividing line between the two levels of courts. 35 However, "the two
categories have been used to describe at least three distinct functions:
law declaration, fact identification, and law application."36 The trial
court may perform all three at one point or another. 37 The appellate

29. Dalton, supra note 22, at 70-71. One excellent example is the redefinition of
the law of defamation concerning public figures by the Supreme Court in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964). Louis, supra note 25, at IOI 7.
30. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233
( 1985).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
32. Louis, supra note 25, at 994.
33. Id. at 1017.
34. Id.
35. See Monaghan, supra note 30, at 235 (quoting H. HART & A. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 374-75
(tentative ed. 1958)):
Law declaration involves "formulating a proposition [that] affects not only the
[immediate] case ... but all others that fall within its ternJs." ...
Fact identification ... is a case-specific inquiry into what happened here.
It is designed to yield only assertions that can be made without significantly
implicating the governing legal principles.
36. Id. at 234.
37. See id. at 234-39. At least some law declaration must occur at the trial level
because "[ q]uite obviously there are occasions when trial judges are acutely aware that
the state of the law they are asked to apply is sorry." Dalton, supra note 22, at 71. Fact
identification is the trial court's special province. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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court will operate in those areas as well, illustrating the difficulties
attendant in deciding "what decisionmaker should decide the issue."38
These allocative decisions, the "need for continuous development of
constitutional principles on a case-by-case basis," and the "danger of
systemic bias of other actors in the judicial system" come together in
any analysis of the scope of review of the application of the law. 39 The
scope has traditionally varied along a continuum from de novo review40
to the "clearly erroneous" standard. 41 It has been argued that in certain
cases involving constitutional questions, de novo appellate review may
be mandatory. 42
A.

The New York Times Rule for the Appellate Scope of Review of
First Amendment Cases

The Supreme Court announced, in the landmark case of New York
Times v. Sullivan, that independent appellate review was required to
ensure that any judgment "does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on
the field of free expression."43 The Court alluded to examination of
mixed questions by saying that the Seventh Amendment's "ban on reexamination of facts does not preclude us from determining whether
governing rules of federal law have been properly applied to the
facts."44
The Court subsequently adopted the New York Times rule in a number
of different First Amendment areas: obscenity,45 defamation, 46 and

38. Monaghan, supra note 30, at 237 ("Law application is a distinctive operation.
The real issue is not analytic, but allocative .... ").
39. Id. at 239.
40. For a more complete discussion of constitutional facts, see id. at 229. See also
Louis, supra note 25.
41. See Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 604 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1045 (1980). For a full discussion of this case and others like it, see Lee,
supra note 15, at 239.
42. See Monaghan, supra note 30, at 246. Professor Monaghan ultimately rejects
the assertion that de novo appellate review is mandatory, even in First Amendment
cases, as an overly broad reading of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
466 U.S. 485 (1984). He notes the "potentially burdensome character" and sense of
overkill in avoiding a "chilling effect" of mandatory de novo review. Id. at 267-71.
43. 376 U.S. 254,285 (1964) (overturning a libel award sustained by the Alabama
Supreme Court. The trial court had found that a full page advertisement, in support of
Martin Luther King when he was arrested in Birmingham, Alabama in connection with
the civil rights protests there and containing insignificant factual errors was "libelous per
se.").
The motivation for this rule may be grounded elsewhere and may not be required. See
infra text accompanying notes 56-85. See also Lee, supra note 15, at 283-84.
44. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285 n.26.
45. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1972) ("First Amendment values
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by
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civil rights boycotts. 47 Each of these cases would appear to support
across-the-board de novo review. The Court most clearly stated that
proposition in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States. 48
In Bose, the Court accepted certiorari specifically to determine whether
the appellate court's de novo review was warranted or should have been
restricted to the "clearly erroneous" standard of FRCP 52(a). 49 The
Court did not restrict its affirmation of de novo review of First
Amendment cases merely to defamation, but construed it broadly "in
order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the
Constitution." 50 But, application of the concept of judicial duty to
apply the standard remains unclear, even within First Amendment
cases, 51 let alone the myriad civil and criminal cases involving
constitutional questions. 52 Henry Monaghan advanced the notion that
appellate discretion in deciding whether to review a case de novo or to
apply a more limited scope of review might well "rest on an unarticulated and undefended neo-Brandeisian premise: only 'personal' constitutional rights, or some kinds of personal rights, warrant close appellate

the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional
claims when necessary."). See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, I 00
(1972).
46. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 485.
47. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). The Court held that
nonviolent boycotts are protected by the First Amendment through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Only violent activity, which falls outside the
protected status afforded by the First Amendment, may be so proscribed. Id. at 915-16
n.50. The Court further reaffirmed its power to '"make an independent examination of
the whole record."' Id. (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,235 (1963)).
48. 466 U.S. at 501 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) "does not inhibit an appellate court's
power to correct errors of law, including those that may infect a so-called mixed finding
of law and fact.").
49. Id. at 487.
50. Id. at 511.
51. Monaghan, supra note 30, at 246.
52. Id. at 264-65. Monaghan cites Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983), as "an excellent ... example of limited review of
constitutional law application. Over commerce and due process clause objections, the
Court upheld application of a state tax to the income of a domestic corporation's foreign
subsidiaries." Monaghan, supra note 30, at 265. In Container Corp., the Court said that
"[i]t will do the cause of legal certainty little good if this Court turns every colorable
claim that a state court erred in a particular application of ... principles into a de novo
adjudication." Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 176. In a footnote, the Court added that
"[t]his approach is, of course, quite different from the one we follow in certain other
constitutional contexts." Id. at 176 n.13. As an example of the contrasting approach,
the Court then cited New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Id.
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scrutiny." 53 Monaghan asked whether, in the wake of Bose, the Court
may "properly limit its grant of review to whether correct first amendment standards have been employed, leaving the 'routine' law application point for final disposition in the court[s] below?" 54 One answer
to that question may lie in whether or not the appellate court views the
state of the law as adequate or in need of further elaboration. Even if
the law needs further elaboration, Monaghan argues that a discretionary,
case-by-case approach may be best where appellate courts pick and
choose the most suitable cases. 55

B.

The "Clearly Erroneous" Standard Examined

In a very different approach to the scope of appellate review, Evan
Lee has argued that appellate courts should adopt the "clearly erroneous"
standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact, and principled
decision-making in de novo review of what the court will consider pure
questions of law. 56 Law and fact lie at two extremes of a continuum
that reflects the allocation of decision-making authority between judges
and juries or between appellate courts and trial courts. 57 The Supreme
Court has defined mixed questions as the application of undisputed law
to established facts. 58
Lee found that the circuit courts used four different models in
adjudicating mixed questions: 59 ( 1) the "clearly erroneous" standard,
practiced by the First and Seventh Circuits; 60 (2) the de novo scope of

53. Monaghan, supra note 30, at 265-66. This notion "reflects the specific
substantive constitutional values at stake rather than generalized notions about the nature
of federal judicial power." Id. at 259.
54. Id. at 246.
55. Id. at 274. Monaghan discusses the Court's approach in habeas corpus cases,
where it has refused to go so far as to require de novo review of each case. Id.
56. Lee, supra note 15, at 238 (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,
287 (1982)). By contrast, mixed questions of law and fact are known as "questions of
ultimate fact." Id. at 238 n.18. An "[u]ltimate fact is the 'legally determinative
consideration ... which is or is not satisfied by subsidiary facts admitted or found by
the trier of fact."' Id. at 238 (quoting Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 286). See also
infra note 58.
57. Lee, supra note 15, at 236.
58. Id. at 235 n. l. According to Lee:
The Court ... defined mixed questions of law and fact as "questions in which
the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed,
and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it
another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or
is not violated."
Id. (quoting Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 289 n.19).
59. Id. at 235-36, 238.
60. Id. at 239.
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review, practiced by the Second, Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits; 61 (3)
a variable standard, practiced by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits; 62 and (4)
no discernible pattern of review in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits.63 Overall concerns of judicial efficiency,64 as well as credibility
and prestige, 65 in Lee's analysis, steer courts in the direction of
restricting the scope of appellate review because government power must
be constrained in order to be legitimized. 66 The appellate process itself
externally constrains the district courts. 67 However, because parties
cannot automatically appeal appellate decisions to the Supreme Court,
the Circuit Courts of Appeal do not suffer the same external constraint.
Lee likened the one external constraint on the Circuit Courts, that of
stare decisis, to the teeth of an old comb: strong, but "sporadically
distributed."68
In order to conserve its continued judicial legitimacy, an appellate
court takes precedential baggage into account when reviewing lower
court decisions de novo. 69 Other courts will necessarily have to follow
the appellate court's decision, often with potentially far-reaching
ramifications. 70 Professor Wechsler postulated that the "main constitu-

61. Id. at 241.
62. Id. at 244.
63. Id. at 245.
64. Id. at 250-52.
65. Id. at 252-54.
66. Id. at 252. Interestingly, Monaghan makes much the same argument in favor
of a duty of appellate courts to make independent review of administrative decisions.
See Monaghan, supra note 30, at 254-63.
67. Lee, supra note 15, at 252. But see Dalton, supra note 22, at 86-93. Dalton
hypothesizes that the constraint may have more to do with the type of judge sitting on
the bench than with any intrinsic, normative influence the appellate process itself has.
For instance, if the judge is merely a bench-warmer, she will "forego the chance to be
a heroine in order to avoid being a goat." Id. at 87. A bench builder, by contrast, takes
her role "quite seriously," takes outcomes quite seriously, and seeks to insulate her
opinion from review at all costs because it was arrived at as a just result. Id.
68. Lee, supra note 15, at 253.
69. Id. at 287.
70. Id at 285-89. Lee applies his model of "principled decision making" to
Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1984). In Clevenger, a
handicapped boy's mother brought suit seeking an injunction to force the local school
board to place her son at a particular school. The Sixth Circuit held that the issue was
a mixed question and averred that such questions may be reviewed freely. But, it also
said that, even under the "clearly erroneous" standard, it would overturn the district
court. Lee analyzed the basis for the court's decision, rather than the outcome. If the
court had made the decision based upon statutory construction, then it would have
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ent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled,"71 capable of producing meaningful precedent. 72 Lee postulates
that a combination of this restrained, "principled decision-making" by
the appellate courts when creating precedent, as well as deference to the
lower courts in all other cases, would provide substitute constraints,
thereby enhancing the legitimacy of appellate review. 73 Thus, if the
appellate court reviews a mixed question and constrains itself to a
"clearly erroneous" standard, then justice may be done in the particular
case without the danger of a broad new precedent being set.
Lee then advanced the hypothesis that the Court was concerned about
state actions reviewed by state court fact-finders in both obscenity and
defamation cases, Bose notwithstanding. 74 He contrasted this independent review to the great leeway the Court granted district courts in the
application of the law to school desegregation cases, starting with Green
v. County School Board. 75 There, the Court wanted quick results and
that required "a great deal of district court discretion."76 Once the
Court had clearly articulated its ultimate goal of banishing de jure
segregation, it adopted a "hands-off' approach to district court remedies
because de jure segregation involved the interests of a wide range of
people. 77 Lee dismissed Bose as an aberration to this pattern, "merely
[a] reflexive application[] of the independent review practice." 78
Lee's pattern also explains the Court's decision in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 79 cited by Justice Scalia in his dissent to

precedential value that would potentially affect vast numbers of future cases. If the court
made the decision based upon a "clearly erroneous" standard, then it was free to consider
only the facts in this particular case without worrying about precedential value. Of
course, the court must make this distinction quite clear in its review, lest there be
confusion. The court did not make itself clear in Clevenger. Lee, supra note 15, at 286.
71. Hans Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 15 (1959).
72. Lee, supra note 15, at 237 (citing id.).
73. Id. See also supra note 70 (discussing Lee's application of the constraints of
deferential review as compared to de novo review in Clevenger, 744 F.2d at 514).
74. Lee, supra note 15, at 281-84. But see Monaghan, supra note 30, at 272 ("The
premise that state courts are to be suspected of distorted factfinding and law application
is disquieting.").
75. Lee, supra note 15, at 266 (citing Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430
( 1968)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 269-70. "Despite outward appearances, it does not seem that the Court
has abandoned its 'hands-off' approach to district court remedies in its recent decision
of the Yonkers desegregation case, Spallone v. United States." Id. at 270 (citing Spallone
v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (I 990)).
78. Id. at 284 n.273 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466
U.S. 485, 518 n.2 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
79. 458 U.S. 886 ( 1982).
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Madsen.Bo The Court overturned the Mississippi Supreme Court's
judgment that black citizens were intimidated by an NAACP-led boycott
of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Mississippi.BI Here
too, the Court was ensuring that southern state courts were not systematically biased against one of the parties. In this context, "[n]on-deferential review ... amounts to little more than supervising the handiwork of
state court fact-finders suspected of acting in bad faith. It falls well
short of disproving the broad notion that the profer role of an appellate
court is restricted to formulating general rules."B Monaghan expressed
alarm that appellate courts would engage in this sort of behavior.B 3
But, indeed, the Court in Claiborne Hardware may have been doing just
that.
In state court cases, such as New York Times v. SullivanB4 and
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,B 5 the Court was also trying to ensure
that the civil rights movement received a fair shake. Both cases
originated in the 1960s as de jure segregation was breathing its last
breath. To have acted otherwise would have prolonged its death. The
Court's actions in the school desegregation cases also conform to this
explanation. The obscenity cases have a similar policy twist: the Court
was attempting to end an era of unwarranted intrusion into free speech
concerns. Both veins could well be said to reflect, at least to a degree,
the dominant public policy concerns of the day.
III.

BACKGROUND TO VITTITOW: THE STATE OF THE LAW ON
CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS ON PROTESTS

The Supreme Court has defined rules concerning content-neutral
restrictions on protests in two related contexts that deal directly with

80. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2533 (1994) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). But, Lee's hypothesis provides a powerful counterpoint to Scalia's
attempt to equate the two movements. For analysis of Justice Scalia's dissent, see infra
text accompanying notes 125-33.
81. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920-24.
82. Lee, supra note 15, at 284.
83. Monaghan, supra note 30, at 272 ("The premise that state courts are to be
suspected of distorted factfinding and law application is disquieting. After all, the
constitution presupposes that the state courts will enforce declared federal law fairly.").
84. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
85. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).

465

antiabortion protest. The first is in the 1988 case of Frisby v. Schultz,B 6
where the Court ruled on the constitutionality of an ordinance that
prohibited residential picketing. The second is in the 1994 case of
Madsen v. Womens Health Center, Inc., where the Court, in a much
broader opinion, seemingly created a new standard ofreview for contentneutral injunctions. 87 With these cases, the Court has defined what
now appears to be a continuum of standards of review for First
Amendment cases. In the traditional public forum, the Court has
reviewed content or viewpoint based restrictions with strict scrutiny.BB
By contrast, the Court has reviewed restrictions that it found contentneutral with an intermediate standard of review, using a principle of
inquiring into "whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech 'without reference to the content of the regulated speech. "'89
In Madsen, because of repeated violation of previous court orders, the
Court expanded the definition of content-neutral restrictions to include
those "incidental to the ... message."90 In contrast, some members of
the Court have reviewed areas of speech and conduct deemed as falling
outside the scope of First Amendment protection on a rational relation
basis. 91
With Madsen and Frisby, the Court has put an overall framework into
place, allowing the lower courts to enforce consistent standards over a
relatively wide range of fact patterns. In both of these cases, the Court
conducted a largely independent review. In both instances, the state of
the law was unsettled and the Court needed to develop constitutional
principles "on a case by case basis."92 But, even while conducting an
independent review, both majority opinions clearly deferred to the lower
courts in some aspects.

86. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
87. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
88. Id. at 2522. "To enforce a content-based exclusion[,] the State must show that
its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end." Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
89. Id. at 2523 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
(upholding noise regulations)).
90. Id. at 2524.
91. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(while majority used an intermediate standard of review to uphold a ban on nude
dancing, Justice Scalia, concurring in the result, would have found nudity non-expressive
conduct per se, separate from dancing, and thus reviewed under a rational relation
standard).
92. Monaghan, supra note 30, at 239.
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A.

Frisby v. Schultz

The appellees, "strongly opposed to abortion," mounted a fa~ial
challenge to an ordinance issued by the town of Brookfield, Wisconsin,
in the wake of antiabortion picketing targeted at residences of abortion
providers. 93 The ordinance made it "unlawful for any person to engage
in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual"94 and had a clearly stated, primary purpose of "protection and
preservation of the home." 95 With five justices joining an opinion
written by Justice O'Connor, 96 the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the ordinance based upon a "well-established principle that statutes will
be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties."97
The majority held that residential streets--even narrow ones---are
clearly a traditional public forum. 98 The Court deferred to the lower
courts in finding the ordinance content-neutral, 99 allowing use of an
intermediate level of scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review. 100
Under that standard, the Court construed the ordinance's ban on protests
as very limited. 101 It then found that the ordinance served a significant
state interest: "'well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home. "' 102
However, Justice O'Connor did note that "particular hypothetical
applications" could have altered the outcome on the issue of how such

93. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476-77 (1987). Appellees and others had
picketed in groups of 11 to 40 outside the residence of a Brookfield, Wisconsin doctor
who "apparently performs abortions ... in neighboring towns." Id. at 476. The town
reacted by enacting the ordinance in May, 1985. The town attorney informed the
appellees of the new ordinance and the town's intent to implement enforcement. "Faced
with this threat of arrest and prosecution, appellees ceased picketing in Brookfield, and
filed this lawsuit." Id. at 477.
94. Id. at 477.
95. Id.
96. Justice White concurred. Id. at 488. Justices Brennan and Stevens dissented
in separate opinions. Id. at 491,496. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan in dissent.
Id. at 491. The division occurred along lines of what standard of review should be
applied. A similar division occurred in Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S.
Ct. 2516 (1994). See infra text accompanying notes 105-33.
97. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483.
98. Id. at 4 79-80.
99. Id. at 482.
100. Id. at 479.
IO I. Id. at 483.
102. Id. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,471 (1980)).

467

an ordinance might have been enforced. 103 As discussed infra, the
enforcement issue can readily explain the different outcome in Vittitow
where an identically worded ordinance was found unconstitutional. 104
B.

The New Standard of Review in Madsen

Madsen v. Womens Health Center, Inc. potentially marks a major
shift in the Court's standard of review for cases involving injunctions
against public protesters who target specific individuals. Courts must
now apply "a somewhat more stringent application of general First
Amendment principles" to injunctions that curb protests to ensure '"that
injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendants than
necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs. "' 105
The case began in 1992 when a Florida state court permanently
enjoined pro-life demonstrators from blocking or interfering with public
access to an abortion clinic after a series of demonstrations aimed at
abortion clinics and the homes of doctors and clinic workers. The trial
court issued a broader injunction six months later when the clinic
complained that the original injunction had not succeeded in allowing
unimpeded access to the clinic. 106 The case was appealed to the
Supreme Court through two different routes. The Florida Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's injunction. 107 In a separate, but parallel
challenge, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the injunction to
be content-based and, thus, unconstitutional based upon a strict scrutiny
standard of review. 108 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
this conflict. 109 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by four other justices,
wrote the Court's opinion. 110

I 03. Id. at 488.
104. Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d 1100, 1106 (6th Cir. 1995).
105. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524-25 (1994)
(quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)).
I 06. Id. at 2521.
107. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993).
108. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993).
109. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
I 10. Both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia wrote separate opinions advocating
differing standards of review. Justice Scalia's advocacy of the application of strict
scrutiny is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 125-33. In contrast to the
majority and to Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens would have governed injunctive relief by
a more lenient standard than legislation because an injunction is more narrowly aimed.
Injunctions "should be judged by a standard that gives appropriate deference to the
judge's unique familiarity with the facts." Id. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Furthermore, the 300-foot ban on protesters approaching persons seeking services
prohibits a species of conduct, not speech. In that light, Stevens argues, the situation is
analogous to labor picketing. Id. at 2532. "Physically approaching" is no broader than
necessary given the unchallenged facts. Id. at 2533.
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The Court used a two-step inquiry. First, it determined whether the
injunction was content-neutral, using previously developed standards.1 11 In the second step, it developed a "more stringent application
of general First Amendment principles." 112 The Court has traditionally
distinguished content-neutral restrictions from content-based restrictions
because the former, if enforced properly, do not affect the nature of the
message, only the methods used to deliver it. Content-based restrictions
reflect a paternalistic concern about how people will react to the
communicative impact of the message. 113 In finding that the injunction
was indeed content-neutral, the Court explained that "the fact that the
injunction covered people with a particular viewpoint does not itself
render the injunction content or viewpoint based." 114 The restrictions
that this injunction directed at the protestors were "incidental to [the
protestor's] antiabortion message because they repeatedly violated the
court's original order." 115 In one of the more significant aspects of
this case, the Court used the record to determine that the injunction was
content-neutral, instead of merely deferring to the lower court, thereby
setting a precedent for broader application of that definition by the lower
courts. 116
The majority then found that the government had demonstrated
legitimate purposes, citing the Florida Supreme Court's decision: (1)
"protecting a woman's freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling
services in connection with her pregnancy;" (2) "public safety and
order;" and (3) protecting the "State's strong interest in residential
privacy, acknowledged in Frisby v. Schultz." 117 The majority further
held that a court must "examine each contested provision ... to see if
it burdens more speech than necessary to accomplish its goal." 118

111. A content-neutral restriction is adopted "'without reference to the content of
the regulated speech."' Id. at 2523 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989)).
112. Id. at 2524.
113. A classic fear of the message may be found in the World War I cases, such
as Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (speech advocating draft avoidance was
punishable). Yet, in the 196Os, a much different approach was taken. See supra note
7.
114. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2523-24.
117. Id. at 2526 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1987)).
118. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526.
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The injunction handed down by the Florida state court 119 followed
earlier, more narrowly based injunctions that had apparently failed to
ensure access to the blockaded clinic. 120 The Court held that some of
the restrictions in the injunction covering access to the clinic, 121 noise
levels in its vicinity, 122 restrictions on sidewalk counseling, 123 and the
use of sound amplification equipment passed muster and others did not.
The Court also restricted the scope of injunctions against residential
picketing. 124
Reflecting the divisive nature of the underlying context of abortion,
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, demanded that the court use a
standard of strict scrutiny because the distinctive characteristics of an
injunction were, for reasons of policy and precedent, as fully in need of
such a level of review as "content-basis" for doing so. 125 His policy
reasons included: (1) danger that injunctions may be sought against a
single issue advocacy group by persons and organizations with a
business or social interest in "suppressing that group's point of
view"; 126 and (2) injunctions

119. Id. at 2521-22.
120. Id. at 2521.
121. The 36-foot buffer near clinic entrances passed muster with the new standard
of review because "some deference must be given to the state court's familiarity with
the facts and background of the dispute ... even under our heightened review." Id. at
2527. But, the Court distinguished the 36-foot buffer on the back and sides of clinic,
which bordered other private property. "Absent evidence that petitioners standing on
private property have obstructed access to the clinic ... this portion of the buffer zone
fails to serve the significant government interests relied on by the Florida Supreme
Court." Id. at 2528.
122. Restrictions on high noise levels outside the clinic were also upheld. "The
First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facility undertake
Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests." Id. at 2528. In contrast
to its rulings on noise levels, the Court found "images observable," such as signs and
banners, a different kettle of fish. Id. at 2529. The Court held that "it is much easier
for the clinic to pull its curtains than for a patient to stop up her ears, and no more is
required to avoid seeing placards through the windows of the clinic." Id.
123. On the grounds that the consent provision burdened more speech than
necessary in restricting sidewalk counselling, the Court invalidated the ban on protesters
approaching anyone within 300 feet of the clinic entrance without her consent in order
to prevent "clinic patients and staff from being 'stalked' or 'shadowed"' by the
protesters. Id.
124. The "prohibition against picketing, demonstrating, or using sound amplification
equipment within 300 feet of the residences of clinic staff' failed because alternatives
were available. Compared to the zone provided for in Frisby, the Court found the 300foot ban on picketing around residences was much too large based on the record. Id. at
2529-30. The zone around the residences was too big in light of possible alternative
limitations on "time, duration of picketing, and number of pickets outside a smaller
zone." Id.
125. Id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 2539.
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are the product of individual judges rather than of legislatures----and often of
judges who have been chagrined by prior disobedience of their orders. The
right to free speech should not lightly be placed within the control of a single
man or woman. . . . [T]he injunction is a much more powerful weapon than a
statute. 127

Persons subject to an injunction face a Robson's choice if they have no
money or time to lodge an appeal: remain silent or face contempt
proceedings. 128
Scalia felt that this injunction was really content-based anyway. The
residual coverage of '"all persons acting in concert or participation with
[the named individuals and organizations], or on their behalf' would not
include those who merely entertained the same beliefs and wished to
express the same views as the named defendants." 129 He quoted
colloquies in his dissent that, in his view, demonstrated that the revised
injunction "is tailored to restrain persons distinguished, not by
proscribable conduct, but by proscribable views." 130 He vehemently
protested that the record failed to demonstrate any violence. But, even
where "First Amendment activity is intermixed with violent conduct,
'precision of regulation' is demanded." 131 Justice Scalia unfavorably
compared the Madsen majority's holding to the holding in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., where blacks were protesting various forms of
racial discrimination. 132 He called abortion protesters a "disfavored
class." 133
Within a few months of the Court handing down the Madsen opinion,
the Sixth Circuit heard an appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by
an Ohio district court prior to Madsen. This injunction stayed enforcement of an ordinance patterned after Frisby. The district court had
issued the injunction against the protesters limiting the scope of their
picketing of the residence of a doctor who performed abortions. 134

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2539-40 (quoting from the language of the injunction).
130. Id. at 2540.
131. Id. at 2541 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963)).
132. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2542-43 (referring to NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886 ( I982)).
133. Id.
134. See Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d I JOO (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 2276 (1995).
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IV.

VITTITOW V. CITY OF UPPER ARLINGTON

A.

Facts

In 1991, plaintiffs targeted the residence of Dr. Raymond Robinson,
a doctor living in Upper Arlington who performed abortions in Dayton,
as a focal point for a number of protests. 135 Dr. Robinson lived on a
cul-de-sac where a few other homes also stood. Plaintiffs repeated their
protests in April, 1992.136 In August, 1992, the City Council responded by passing an ordinance that read: "No person shall engage in
picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in
this City." 137 Plaintiffs again targeted the doctor in October, 1992.
Police responded to a complaint and asked plaintiffs to leave after
determining that probable cause existed that a specific house was
targeted in contravention of the ordinance. Plaintiffs left without further
incident. Police took a videotape of the incident. 138
Plaintiffs then brought an action in district court seeking an injunction
against the enforcement of the ordinance, alleging that it violated their
constitutional rights under the First Amendment. 139 The district court
issued a preliminary order enjoining the city from enforcing the
ordinance. But, the order provided for conditional enforcement:
1) Picketers shall continue moving at all times and shall not stop or gather in
front of or around any residence; 2) Picketers shall not give undue emphasis to
directing their activities to one residence; 3) The presence or absence of signs,
banners, etc. shall not in any way diminish or enhance the activities of the
picketers; 4) Picketers shall at all times be mindful of the legitimate and
compelling interest of the City of Upper Arlington to maintain traffic and
safety-particularly as it applies to children. Picketers are directed to obey any
legitimate orders of the police concerning the safety of those in the area being
picketed; 5) The City of Upper Arlington shall adopt, issue and post appropriate
written authority to comply with this Order within thirty (30) days of the
issuance of the Court's pending Opinion and Order. 140

Sua sponte, the district court modified its order because it considered
the original order unworkable. The court held that:
I. Defendants may not prevent plaintiffs from picketing in any particular
residential neighborhood, street, or cul-de-sac. 2. Defendants may, however,
properly prevent plaintiffs from picketing in front of: (a) the doctor's home,

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
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Id. at 1101.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1101-02 & n.3.
Id. at 1102.
Id.
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and (b) the two homes on either side of the doctor's home. 3. Similarly,
defendants may properly prevent plaintiffs or others from picketing in front of:
(a) the home of anyone defendants have probable cause to believe is the target,
focus or subject of the picketing, as well as (b) the two homes on either side
of the home just described. 141

Both parties appealed this later injunction. 142

B.

The Sixth Circuit's Analysis of the Injunction

The appeals court held that the injunction itself was content-neutral
under the inquiry used in Madsen. 143 "[N]one of the restrictions
imposed by the court were directed at the contents of [plaintiffs']
message .... 144 The injunction (as well as the ordinance) seeks to
regulate not plaintiffs' message, but rather the means by which plaintiffs
seek to convey their message." 145 The court also found that the
ordinance itself was content-neutral, citing the Frisby Court's concerns
about "privacy of the home." 146
The court then inquired into "whether the challenged provisions [of
the injunction] burden no more speech than is necessary to serve that
interest." 147 The plaintiffs contended that the "modified injunction
would allow the City to arrest and prosecute individuals for doing little
more than walking down a city sidewalk." 148 The court used both
Frisby and Madsen as a basis for a de novo inquiry into the injunction,
as well as into the enforcement of the ordinance.

141. Id. at I 102-03 (citing Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 830 F. Supp. 1077,
1083 (S.D. Ohio 1993)).
142. Id. at I 102.
143. Id. at 1104.
144. Id. (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2523
(1994)).
145. Id.
146. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,484 (1988). Justice O'Connor's opinion,
extensively quoted in Vittitow, went on to say, "Our prior decisions have often remarked
on the unique nature of the home, 'the last citadel of the tired, the weary and the sick."'
Id. (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)). She
also wrote that "[ o]ne important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the
unwilling listener. ... [A] special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their
own walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions." Id.
at 484-85.
147. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1105.
148. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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The Vittitow court noted that the Frisby Court "saved [the ordinance]
by the extraordinary measure of accepting counsel's representation at
oral argument before the Supreme Court as to how the ordinance would
be enforced." 149 The Vittitow court then chastised the city for adopting
the Frisby ordinance language when "a federal district judge, a divided
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and four Supreme Court Justices
found it to be overbroad." 150 Ultimately, the Vittitow court found
enforcement of the ordinance to contravene the Madsen standard. 151
It used this record of enforcement to distinguish Frisby. 151 The court
further noted:
Finally, and most important, the videotape and the testimony in this case
indicate how the City reads Frisby in enforcing this ordinance. The videotape
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit H) demonstrates that the City's police view the ordinance
as violated when they can discern one residence as being the target of picketing.
In our view, that is a misreading of Frisby. All picketing of this nature will
have a target, otherwise it is not really picketing. Frisby could not be more
clear: "[O]nly focused p,icketing taking place solely in front of a particular
residence is prohibited." 53

However, in this finding, the court did not explain exactly what in the
district court's opinion offended it. The court merely took issue with the
trial judge who "tried to save this ordinance with a one-size-fits-all
injunction." 154 The court said that "the complete ban on residential
picketing mandated by the ordinance [is] inconsistent" with Madsen and
entered a permanent injunction against enforcement of the ordinance. 155
The court refused to remand the case to the district court to have the
injunction, the ordinance, and the enforcement of the ordinance
reconsidered in light of the Madsen standard. As the dissent pointed out,
the district court had yet to hold a full hearing on the merits. 156 The
Vittitow court justified its actions by recognizing that federal '"courts do
not rewrite statutes to create constitutionality."' 157 It furthermore
chastised the city for failing to learn from Frisby in writing such a broad

149. Id. at 1106.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (distinguishing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1987)). In Frisby,
Justice O'Connor expressed the concern that such an ordinance might well have been
found unconstitutional if it had been improperly enforced. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 488. See
also supra text accompanying note I 03.
153. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1106-07 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483).
154. Id. at I 107.
155. Id.
156. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1106 (quoting Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118, 1122 (6th Cir.
1991)).
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ordinance. 158 Nor would the court give either plaintiff or the city "an
advisory opinion as to how the ordinance might be enforced." 159
C.

The Dissent

Judge Martin's dissent focussed on the procedural posture of the case
and did not argue the merits of the injunction, the ordinance, or the
enforcement of the ordinance. He postulated that the merits of the
ordinance had never been argued. 160 In his eyes, the district court had
merely issued a preliminary injunction, an equitable remedy designed to
"maintain the relative positions of the parties until proceedings on the
merits [could] be conducted." 161 Judge Martin argued that FRCP Rule
65(a)(2) does allow a consolidated proceeding when an injunction is
issued, but that did not occur in this case. 162
Because this was a preliminary injunction only, Judge Martin said that
the appropriate standard of review should have been one of deference.
The "decision of a district court to grant a preliminary injunction is
'generally accorded a great deal of deference on appellate review and
will only be disturbed if the court relied upon clearly erroneous findings
of fact, improperly applied the governing law, or used an erroneous legal
standard. "' 163 He found "no clear error." 164 In his eyes, the majority
obviously thought that the plaintiff would succeed on the merits. "The
majority should have stopped its analysis there and affirmed the district
court as to the propriety of issuing the injunction, assuming they find no

158. Id. at I 107.
159. Id.
I 60. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. Id. at I 107-08.
163. Id. at I I 08 (quoting Michigan Coalition v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th
Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 954 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1992)). The dissent said
that, in reviewing a preliminary injunction, it must balance four factors in reviewing only
for abuse of discretion. These factors are:
"(I) the likelihood that the party seeking the preliminary injunction will
succeed on the merits of the claim; (2) whether the party seeking the
injunction will suffer irreparable harm without the grant of the extraordinary
relief; (3) the probability that granting the injunction will cause substantial
harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest is advanced by the issuance
of the injunction."
Id. at 1108-09 (quoting Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994)).
164. Id. at 1109.
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error in the district courts' findings and conclusions on the other
factors." 165
Even though Judge Martin found no abuse of discretion in the granting
of the injunction itself, he went on to say that the district court could
abuse its discretion in the scope of the injunction. He said that the
scope of the injunction was the "crux of the parties' disput(}-whether
the three (or five) house buffer zone is constitutional" 166 under the
standards of Frisby, 167 and under Madsen, 168 which was decided after
the parties briefed the issues. He further stated, "Because the size of the
buffer zone at issue here is unclear, I would construe the injunction as
creating a three-house zone and would remand for the district court to
clarify its order accordingly." 169
Judge Martin clearly viewed Frisby as balancing the "residential
privacy interests of the homeowner with the First Amendment rights of
the picketers who were, as here, engaged in focused, targeted picketing."170 Using the Supreme Court's rationale of balancing competing
interests, he construed Frisby as not preventing the banning of "forms
of targeted, focused residential picketing" other than that "taking place
solely in front of one home." 171
In this case,
[m]erely because the plaintiffs chose to march slowly by other residences, as
well as the targeted residence, does not insulate their activity from regulation.
The targeted homeowner is as much a captive audience when picketers
repeatedly march in front of a home as when they are standing still. The
psychological injury and disturbance to the tranquility of the home are not
reduced because the picketers are marching slowly. 172

With that, Judge Martin would have affirmed the district court's
injunction as proper in seeking to curb the undesirable effects of
plaintiffs' targeted picketing. 173
Judge Martin was critical of the new standard of review in Madsen.
"Because [it] does not alter my analysis, I wonder if this is a 'new' test
for content-neutral injunctions." 174 He did not believe that the Madsen
Court correctly interpreted Frisby. He did not see Frisby as creating a

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
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Id.
Id. at 1110.

Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1987).
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1110 (Martin, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1111.
Id.
Id.
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zone as did the Madsen Court. 175 He viewed the striking down of a
300-foot zone around the residence of a target of the picketing as heavily
fact-dependent. 176 Indeed, the Madsen Court held that "the record
before us does not contain sufficient justification for this broad a ban on
picketing." 177
Even so, using the Madsen standard, Judge Martin would have found
the three-house zone "no more burdensome than necessary to protect the
significant governmental interest in protecting residential privacy." 178
Judge Martin was very aware of the difference in facts in individual
cases when he contrasted the thirty-six foot buffer in front of the clinic
in Madsen with the cul-de-sac in Vittitow. 179 He was concerned that,
given the physical layout of the cul-de-sac, a zone might not be
adequate. He thought that even limiting the number of picketers could
be justified. 180
Judge Martin then called for the Supreme Court to modify traditional
public fora analysis of residential streets and sidewalks. 181 Several
factors, such as whether the residents of these streets would consider
them "traditional public fora," private ownership of the fee to the land
underlying the streets, and private maintenance of sidewalks in many
neighborhoods, combined with residential privacy interests, led him "to
believe that it's time to reconsider whether all streets over which the
public may travel are traditional public fora." 182

175. Id. As Judge Martin correctly points out, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
accepts the creation of a zone in Frisby as a matter of course. The word "zone" does
not appear anywhere on the cited page in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,483 (1988).
The Frisby opinion's emphasis on a balancing of interests, as highlighted by Judge
Martin, meshes with this author's analysis infra calling for a more limited appellate
review when the case law is well settled. Judge Martin's interpretation of Frisby
neutralizes criticism of that opinion for not fully exploring all of the permutations that
an ordinance and its subsequent enforcement could create by allowing a balancing of
interests to take place. That balance really is at the heart of the face-off between the
competing parties.
176. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1111.
177. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
178. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1111 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing Madsen, I 14 S. Ct. at
2524).
I 79. Id.
180. Id. at 1112.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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V.

WHY MADSEN-TYPE CASES ESCAPE THE "CHILLING EFFECT"
DANGERS

Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent to Madsen that the context for
the new standard of review is abortion, but the case itself is all about an
injunction against free speech. 183 Kathleen Sullivan sounded the tocsin
about the chilling effect of First Amendment regulation in an article
chronicling "a recent sea change in the politics of free speech." 184 She
cited the "various recent measures to curtail the obstruction of abortion
clinics by anti-abortion demonstrators," such as passage of FACE and
the holding in Madsen, as exemplars of that sea change. She pointed out
that Operation Rescue and other antiabortion groups make the argument
that they should be protected by the same free speech doctrines that
protected the civil rights movement, "but advocacy groups that typically
argue for free speech pointedly have not flocked to their defense." 185
Justice Scalia sounded a similar theme when he called the abortion
protesters a "disfavored class," 186 unfavorably comparing the outcome
of Madsen to that in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 187 where
nonviolent aspects of a boycott of local businesses, marred by sporadic
outbreaks of violence, were held '"entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment. "' 188 These concerns echo those of the Court in New York
Times, Bose, and other cases discussed supra. 189 Sullivan proffered a
possible institutional framework to articulate the dangers of government
regulation of speech, involving three possibilities: first, the '"banned in
Boston' phenomenon-making speech taboo may perversely increase
demand"; second, the risk of error when government regulates speech as
compared to, say, commercial regulation; and third, the danger of
trusting government to change culture. 190
But, neither the standard of review in Madsen nor controlling the
scope of appellate review ostensibly try to ban content-based speech.
That alone reduces the risk of a chilling effect. By contrast, in New
York Times v. Sullivan, the Alabama courts were trying to attack the

183.

Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2534-35 (1994) (Scalia,

J., dissenting).

184. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REV. 203 (1994).
185. Id. at 206.
186. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2542.
187. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
188. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2543 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Claiborne
Hardware, 458 U.S. at 915).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 56-85.
190. Sullivan, supra note 184, at 214.
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very content of the advertisements in question. 191 The one goal that
Madsen does not have is that of trying to change culture. It and Frisby
are faced with balancing the competing, constitutionally protected
interests of two nearly irreconcilable groups: the antiabortion picketers
(with their right to protest) and the abortion providers and the women
seeking abortions (with their rights to residential privacy and access to
abortion facilities). The very act of balancing these interests is likely to
increase dialogue, not stifle it.
Justice Scalia is correct when he points out that a single district court
judge issuing an injunction may involve some risk that a particular
application of a content-neutral standard could be pretextual. 192 But
appellate review, even of the relatively restricted "clearly erroneous"
standard, stands as a formidable external constraint on any district court
judge's abuse of discretion. 193 Furthermore, systematic bias has
historically been a state court problem, not federal. Claiborne Hardware
was a paradigm for Lee's observations about systematic state court bias,
where the state courts' seemingly content-neutral standard was merely
pretext and really aimed at the message itself. 194 The Court has
always reviewed First Amendment cases de novo because the fairness of
state court review of state actions was in question. 195
The risk of a "chilling effect" may also be decreased because the prolife movement, as a single issue movement, may be quite distinguishable
from past protest movements, such as the civil rights movement, in the
extent of the protest the movement should allow itself. Both former
Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas and philosopher John Rawls make
cogent arguments that a right to protest may be limited in a reasonably
just society.

191. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
192. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2539 ("often [issued by] judges who have been
chagrined by prior disobedience of their orders").
I 93. Lee, supra note 15, at 237, 252. See also Dalton, supra note 22, at 86-93. See
also supra text accompanying notes 69-78, especially notes 70 and 73.
194. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915-16 n.50 (1982)
(quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)) ("This Court's duty is not limited
to the elaboration of constitutional principles; we must also ... review the evidence ...
particularly since the question is one of alleged trespass across 'the line between speech
unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated."').
195. Lee, supra note 15, at 281-84.
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VI. WHY JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN THE SCOPE OF APPELLATE
REVIEW MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL PUBLIC POLICY BENEFITS IN
ANTI-ABORTION PROTEST CASES
Former Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas examined the issues of
dissent and civil disobedience in American society in 1968, at the height
of the antiwar and civil rights movements, examining the paradox of the
duty to obey and to disobey. 196 He recognized that
the citizen has the right, protected by the Constitution, to criticize, however
intemperately; to protest, however strongly; to draw others to his cause; and in
mass, peaceably to assemble. The state must not only respect these rights and
refrain from punishing their exercise but it must also protect the dissenter
against other citizens who seek by force, harassment, or interference to prevent
him from exercising these rights. 197

Fortas then opined that the United States has not always lived up to this
theory. 198 Yet, in Fortas's eyes, "this obviously does not mean that the
state must tolerate anything and everything that includes opposition to
the government or to government law or policy.... 199 The state may
and should act if the protest includes ... substantial interference with []
the rights of others .... " 20 Clearly, Fortas's theme recognized that
the competing interests of the various sides involved in dissent must be
balanced and that, in theory, that balance will be a level one even if, in
practice, it may occasionally be tilted one way or another. 201
In 1971, John Rawls wrote his magnum opus, A Theory of Justice,
examining the same issues in the broader context of delineating the rules
by which a society should proceed in order to be just. 202 In it, he
advanced a position that one's duty to obey the law may well override
one's right to resist injustice, when, under certain conditions, they
confl.ict. 203 These themes, when combined with the increased certainty

°

196. ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1968).
197. Id. at 43-44.
198. Id.
I 99. Id. at 47.
200. Id. at 48.
20 I. Id. at 52.
202. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
203. Id. at 350-55. But see Daniel M. Farrell, Dealing With Injustice in a
Reasonably Just Society: Some Observations on Rawls' Theory of Political Duty, in
JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 187 (H. Gene Blocker & Elizabeth H. Smith
eds., 1980). Farrell calls Rawls's contention of political duty into question because the
effects of decisions made in the original position cannot be predicted and, thus, only
principles can be decided on. Society must then implement those principles when
confronted with a problem. Farrell contends that Rawls's position really is a form of
institutionalism for which there are no compelling arguments. However, he leaves the

480

Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington

[VOL. 33: 453, 1996]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

of enforcement brought on by a reduced scope of review, and the lack
of "chilling effect" discussed supra, support controlling the scope of
review in Madsen injunction cases as opposed to broader movements,
such as the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Key to this
argument is the basic assumption, discussed supra, that district courts
have yet to exhibit a systematic bias against a particular side in the
abortion debate, as distinguished from the systematic bias Lee observed
in state courts in defamation and obscenity cases. 204

A.

Rawls and A Theory of Justice

If Justice Fortas was speaking specifically to a generation involved in
the paroxysms of the civil rights movement and antiwar protests, his
message still has currency today. John Rawls, writing at about the same
time, approaching the right of dissent and the duty of obeying the law
from a more theoretical level, arrives at a similar conclusion, but with
a paradigm for discussing how that balance may be struck. He does so
by looking not at "our system of government" per se, but at the very
nature of the contract between a society and its people. Indeed, Rawls
sees "justice as fairness" as an example of what he called a contract
theory. 205 Parties to a social contract must make decisions about this
contract and the nature of the fundamental agreements in it in an
"original position." Starting at the original position ensures the creation
of a "fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just."206
This original position, then, must be found behind a "veil of ignorance"
where the parties do not know certain kinds of facts, such as one's place
in society, intelligence, and cultural biases. 207
Rawls posits that, in the original position, parties to the contract will
accept some form of majority rule and a set of procedures, because

question open until Rawls's reasoning is more clearly elucidated. This does not call into
question, however, Rawls's position on civic duty of a member of the reasonably just
society to obey the law over civilly protesting an injustice.
204. See text accompanying notes 74-85.
205. RAWLS, supra note 202, at 16.
206. Id. at 136.
207. For a more complete discussion, see id. at 136-42. For a critical assessment
of the veil of ignorance, see Louis I. Katzner, The Original Position and the Veil of
Ignorance, in JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 42 (H.
Gene Blocker & Elizabeth H. Smith eds., 1980).
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consent to these procedures is "surely preferable to no agreement at
all."208 In accepting majority rule, the parties take a duty of civility
that imposes "a due acceptance of the defects of the institutions and a
certain restraint in taking advantage of them"; without them, mutual trust
and confidence would break down. 209
Rawls's theory allows civil disobedience, defined as public, nonviolent, conscientious, yet political acts, 210 to occur in opposition to
"instances of substantial and clear injustice, and preferably to those
which obstruct the path to removing other injustices."211 He defined
three conditions that a movement must meet to practice civil disobedience in a reasonably just society. The first is whether the object of
protest is appropriate for civil disobedience. 212 The second is that the
political process has failed, even though "normal appeals to the political
majority have already been made in good faith." 213 The third condition arises when the natural duty of justice requires a certain restraint;214 society can absorb only so much civil disobedience or else
serious disorder could follow and disrupt "the efficacy of the just
constitution. " 215
If the pro-life movement can meet these conditions, they could and
should, under Rawls's theory, engage in a campaign of civil disobedience with the government giving them wide latitude. If the movement
cannot meet these conditions, then society cannot tolerate civil disobedience, let alone violent protest. To preserve social stability, the
government may fashion limits to the scope of allowable protest in order
to balance the rights of the rest of the society against those of the
movement.

208. RAWLS, supra note 202, at 354. This logic calls to mind Hobbes's aphorism
of "the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" in the absence of societal
constraints. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 186 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin
Books 197 I) ( I 651 ).
209. RAWLS, supra note 202, at 355.
2 I 0. Id. at 364.
211. Id. at 372.
212. Id. at 371-73.
213. Id. at 373.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 374. Rawls assumes that
there is a limit on the extent to which civil disobedience can be engaged in
without leading to a breakdown in the respect for law. . . . There is also an
upper bound on the ability of the public forum to handle such forms of dissent
. . . . [T]he effectiveness of civil disobedience as a form of protest declines
beyond a certain point; and those contemplating it must consider these
constraints.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
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A comparative analysis of the pro-life movement with another, now
universally accepted, civil disobedience campaign may help illuminate
whether the pro-life movement meets Rawls's three conditions.
Accepting the pro-life argument that abortion is murder, then the
movement clearly meets Rawls's first condition. In this analysis, one
could also stipulate that there are no competing protest movements
forcing curtailment of the overall level of dissent, thus meeting Rawls's
third condition. 216 The critical question is whether the movement has
met the second condition or not.
To meet the second condition, the political process must have failed
the movement. Legal means of redress would have proved ineffective.
The indifference of the political parties to the movement's demands to
have laws repealed or modified would exemplify such a failure. Another
example would be failure of legal protest and demonstrations, especially
over a period of time. 217 It would not be inaccurate to describe the
civil rights movement in the mid-1950s and 1960s as facing a failed
political process. Seventy-five years of institutionalized Jim Crow in the
South had effectively marginalized blacks. White dominance of the
political process was complete. The march on Birmingham, Alabama in
1963 starkly symbolized the daunting odds blacks in the South faced,
even when certain parts of the political process had begun to operate in
favor of redressing the imbalance of the races. 218
The pro-life movement in 1995 has a degree of access to the political
system undreamed of by the civil rights movement prior to the midl 960s. Numerous Supreme Court decisions have altered the Court's
position on abortion since Roe v. Wade, 219 although it has not been

216. However, as Rawls indicated (see supra note 215), even one protest movement
at a time could be too much for the society if it is excessive, not to mention that the
movement could reach a point of diminishing returns. See RAWLS, supra note 202, at
373.
217. Id.
218. For a more complete analysis of the origins of the civil rights movement in the
1950s and early I 960s, and a recounting of the failure of the political process, see
HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY (2d ed. 1993). For a focus
more on the leaders themselves and the origins of their philosophical underpinnings, see
TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS !954-63
(I 988).
219. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (characterizing a woman's choice on whether to have an
abortion as a fundamental right of privacy protected under the Substantive Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Numerous decisions, culminating in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, SOS U.S. 833 (1992), have considerably undercut the scope of the
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completely reversed. Although many prov1s1ons have been ruled
unconstitutional under Roe, numerous state legislatures have passed laws
severely restricting access to abortion, powerfully demonstrating pro-life
influence. 220 Even President Bush advocated a constitutional amendment restricting abortion. 221 Congress has, since 1977, restricted
federal funding for abortions. 222 The Republican Party has openly
debated adoption of an anti-abortion stance in every presidential election
since 1980. 223
Despite the lack of success in achieving all of their aims, the pro-life
movement has demonstrably shifted the terms of the abortion debate
over the course of the last twenty years. These characteristics do not
denote a failure of the political process, but rather show a political
process with the capacity to balance, albeit imperfectly, two seemingly
irreconcilable political movements. With this sort of access to an
ongoing political dialogue, the pro-life movement fails to meet Rawls's
second condition. With this failure, recourse to civil disobedience falls
outside the bounds of acceptable protest under Rawls's theory. The prolife movement would appear duty bound to accept limits to the scope of
their protest even if they find it unjust.
The nature of the violence surrounding the two movements also
strongly distinguishes them. The civil rights movement itself drew on
strong themes of nonviolence throughout the 1950s and 1960s.224

fundamental right to choice.
220. See. e.g., the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in I 988
and 1989, which formed the basis for the challenge culminating in Planned Parenthood,
505 U.S. at 833.
221. This position represented a major political shift for Bush, who was pro-choice
as recently as the 1980 election. Presumably, he would not have made this public volteface without a calculation of the political capital he was likely to gain. It also reflects
the potency of the pro-life lobby to the Republican Party and the resulting healthy
respect for it that some politicians developed. See, e.g., Gerald F. Seib, The Inauguration: Into the Fray, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1989, at R7 ("Earlier in his career ... [he]
opposed a constitutional amendment banning abortion, yet he campaigned in 1988 ...
in favor of an abortion amendment.").
222. Eric Pianin, Senate Keeps Medicaid Abortion Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 29,
1993, at A 11 (Senate voted to keep restrictions on public funding for abortions that had,
in various guises, been in place since the Hyde Amendment was first adopted in 1977).
223. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Abortion Battle Cry Heard Inside GOP; Rights Supporters
Vow Fight to Remove or Weaken Party Plank, WASH. POST, July 21, 1991, at A4
(describing the struggle between pro-choice and pro-life factions in months prior to the
I 992 general election campaign). See also Republicans Backed by Abortion Foes, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 12, 1995, at AIO ("The head of the Christian Coalition said
yesterday he believes the Republican Party will keep its anti-abortion stance and that it
is the Democratic Party 'that has an abortion problem.'").
224. See, e.g., BRANCH, supra note 218, at 140 (in a speech in Montgomery,
Alabama in December of 1955, Martin Luther King declared at a rally in the early days
of the Montgomery bus boycott, "Now let us say that we are not here advocating
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Violence was visited upon the movement from southern whites opposed
to desegregation. 225 The pro-life movement faces a much different
political picture. By all accounts, violence in the abortion debate has
largely sprung from the fringe elements of the movement itself. 226
Arguably, a movement that has engendered the violence itself is under
even more of a duty than otherwise to obey Rawls's tenet.
The Madsen restraints, while appearing unjust to the pro-life
movement, lie quite plausibly within the acceptable bounds of justice
when viewed in the context of the failure of the pro-life movement to
meet Rawls's conditions, the violence surrounding the movement
originating from its fringe elements, and the lack of a "chilling effect"
on the exercise of First Amendment rights, as discussed supra.
Therefore, the state may, and should, enforce content-neutral restrictions
in order to balance the various competing interests. The Supreme Court,
if it had not already endorsed this proposition in its two-track analysis
of content-based and content-neutral speech, has explicitly acknowledged
the acceptability of limits to the way a message is delivered by
developing the new "intermediate plus" standard of review in
Madsen. 227 The Court has, more clearly than ever, articulated the
difference between a state apparatus crushing the message228 and the
state trying to control the dysfunctional externalities attendant to a
particular method of dissent. 229

violence.... We have overcome that. ... The only weapon that we have in our hands
this evening is the weapon of protest.").
225. For a particularly compelling account of the nature of the extremist reactions
to the 1963 campaign in Birmingham, Alabama, see id. at 793-800.
226. See, e.g., Henry Chu & Mike Clary, Doctor, Volunteer Slain Outside Abortion
Clinic, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1994, at A I ("Hill often demonstrated outside the clinic
[where the victims were slain] with placards advocating violence against doctors who
perform abortions.").
227. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2525 (1994) ("[W]hen
evaluating a content-neutral injunction, we think that our standard time, place, and
mannet analysis is not sufficiently rigorous.").
228. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the Court
limited a state's power to award damages in libel actions by developing what has
become widely known as the "New York Times malice" test and by insisting upon de
novo review of such cases. As Lee pointed out, this case took place during the middle
of the Civil Rights movement in a state, Alabama, that was fiercely resisting the
dismantling of Jim Crow. See supra text accompanying notes 69-85.
229. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524.
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Clearly, Justice Scalia and others do not support that contention. 230
Others have postulated that the courts and legislatures should not
exercise the limits defined by Madsen and FACE because to do so may
"cut off pro-lifers' every hope in these matters. In order for pro-lifers
to work within the system, they must believe that their views can
somehow in the end have an impact."231 However, those arguments
tend to lose their force in view of the conclusion reached through
Rawlsian analysis: the pro-life movement can-and has for
years---adequately accessed the political system. The Madsen limits also
do not preclude public protest per se nor do they in any way impinge
upon the expression of particular viewpoints. Indeed, by providing a
legal mechanism for separating the two sides, they provide a possible
mechanism for easing the conditions that may be leading to some of the
extreme examples of violence.
B.

Theory of Certainty of Enforcement

The best way to enforce any law is with certainty. 232 The restriction
of the scope of appellate review in federal actions will add to the
certainty of enforcement. Protesters will not be able to delay the
enforcement of injunctions by appealing, unless the district court judges
have abused their discretion in the application of established law. The
injunctions will be seen as a line drawn in the sand to constrain the
behavior of protesters. "'The certainty of a punishment, even if it be
moderate, will always make a stronger impression than the fear of
another which is more terrible but combined with the hope of impunity. "'233 Deterrence is one of the central tenets in support of granting
injunctions in cases of civil disobedience, let alone violent protest. Even
those who oppose the use of injunctions to curb civil disobedience

230. Id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
231. Stith, supra note l O (interpreting Madsen as enjoining sidewalk counselling,
which cuts off pro-lifers' hope to work within the system nonviolently); see also
Ledewitz, supra note 10, at 135-36 (criticizing efforts to limit antiabortion protests
through the use of injunctions and ordinances, citing fear of an inevitable "chilling
effect").
232. Debate has raged heavily about the deterrent value of the death penalty. See
Frank G. Carrington, Deterrence, Death, and the Victims of Crime: A Common Sense
Approach, 35 VAND. L. REV. 587,588 (1982). The author argues that punishment has
a deterrent value, despite being empirically unprovable, because the "pure threat of
sanction as a deterrent to criminal activity ... is logically compelling." Id. at 605.
233. RALPH D. ELLIS & CAROL S. ELLIS, THEORIES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A
CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL 7 (1989) (quoting CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS ] ] (1963)).
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concede that enforcement of ordinances that protect the homes of protest
targets have their role. 234
In the abortion protest cases, deterrence is only the penultimate goal.
The ultimate goal is a reduction in the intensity of the atmosphere
surrounding the clinics that should lead to a change in tactics by the prolife movement. The various pro-life groups might actually limit
themselves. 235 If the pro-life movement adopts other tactics, such as
renewed pressure within the political system, and other types of
campaigns to influence public opinion, then the danger of violence as an
outgrowth of the clinic protests may decrease.
The focus upon the clinics as the source of evil, from the perspective
of the pro-life movement, has increased the likelihood of violence. 236
Thus, changing the focus to the political process, which, even now,
appears to be as accessible as ever, 237 may defuse the heightened
tensions that now exist around the clinics.
By limiting the scope of appellate review to the "clearly erroneous"
standard or to an "abuse of discretion" standard, both injunctions and
ordinances will receive the Madsen standard of review. The demonstrable lack of systematic bias within the federal system protects against the
need for the level of independent review that the Supreme Court
exercised in the obscenity and defamation cases. 238 If the combination
of a clear federal cause of action under FACE and the certainty of
enforcement of injunctions had been available in Melbourne, Florida, the
years of tension and the threat of violence there could have been
attenuated. 239 Conceivably, the December, 1994 murders in Massachusetts might have been avoided if the atmosphere outside that clinic had
been less charged.

234. Ledewitz, supra note 10, at 128.
235. Id. at 135.
236. Douglas Frantz, The Rhetoric of Terror, TIME, Mar. 27, 1995, at 48.
237. Republicans Backed, supra note 223. See also White House 1996 GOP
Pla!form: Pro-Lifers Call For Return to Party Values, AM. POL. NETWORK ABORTION
REP., Mar. 20, 1995 (Focus on Family President James Dobson called on Republican
National Committee Chairman Haley Barbour not to ignore evangelical Christians and
to ensure that the pro-life plank remains in the GOP platform. The Family Research
Council's Gary Bauer threatened formation ofa third party for the 1996 elections if the
Republicans did not sufficiently adhere to the pro-life stance.).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 56-85.
239. See Biskupic, supra note 2.
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Empirically, this conclusion would be difficult to prove. 240 But, if
one accepts Rawls's notion of a duty of civility, even when the law is
a perceived injustice, then stimulating the pro-life movement into
heightened reliance on the political processes to relieve the stress on the
social fabric while, at the same time, avoiding a "chilling effect" on the
substance of dissent, may be an important public policy goal for the
courts. The next question is what effect limiting the scope of appellate
review would have on a given situation.

VIL

ANALYSIS OF VJITITOW IN LIGHT OF THE MIXED QUESTION
DOCTRINE

Judge Martin's dissent in Vittitow, criticizing the majority for reaching
the merits of the challenge to the ordinance, 241 matches very neatly
with the philosophy behind limiting the appellate scope of review. The
interests of judicial economy and upholding the legitimacy of the district
court would seemingly dictate allowing the full hearing or the consolidated hearing called for in FRCP 65(a)(2). At the very least, the
majority could have remanded the case back to the district court for
resolution under Madsen. Arguably, the standards called for in Madsen
are stricter than those used by courts previously and, thus, will provide
a greater degree of protection if properly applied. 242 Presumably, the
district court would have heeded that additional guidance if the case had
been remanded. But, Judge Martin put his finger on the bottom line in
Vittitow:
While the district court in this case may have had more evidence or more time
to consider whether to issue the preliminary injunction than is usual, neither of
these factors transforms the district court's findings or conclusions into final
findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding the merits of the plaintiffs'
complaint. 243

It may well be that the district court would have eventually reached
much the same conclusion that the majority did. But, the decision
precludes it from doing so. The ordinance, though similar to the
Brookfield, Wisconsin ordinance challenged in Frisby, was not
240. However, Congress connected the escalation of violence directed at abortion
clinics to the change in tactics and the increased use of blockades. See H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 488, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 724, 724.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 163-65.
242. See Murray v. Lawson, 649 A.2d 1253 (N.J. 1994). The New Jersey Supreme
Court changed an injunction after remand from the Supreme Court in the wake of
Madsen, commenting that "as currently structured, the injunction does not satisfy the
stricter standards ... announced in Madsen." Id. at 1264.
243. Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d 1100, I 108 (6th Cir. 1995)
(Martin, J., dissenting).
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challenged facially, but based upon its enforcement. 244 Although the
majority in Frisby construed the ordinance in a most favorable light, it
did concede that the outcome may well have changed if a different fact
pattern had been before it. 245 Vittitow could very well be that different
fact pattern. Furthermore, the district court was also balancing the First
Amendment rights of plaintiff against Dr. Robinson's right to privacy,
finding at least a "significant overnment interest"246 in protecting him
while the case was resolved. 24
The majority pointed out that this case varied from Frisby because
plaintiffs did not facially challenge the ordinance. Enforcement had
taken place. The enforcement itself apparently triggered overturning the
ordinance because it presented the open field to do so.248 The Supreme Court, by going to "extraordinary measures" to save the statute
in Frisby, left the field open for further statutory interpretation. 249
Indeed, one could argue that it left matters umesolved enough that the
Upper Arlington City Attorney's office, in its attempt to follow the case
law, opened itself to criticism from the Sixth Circuit. 250
The ultimate question is whether the outcome would have varied if the
Sixth Circuit had allowed the district court to complete its process.
Given the apparent agreement of both the majority and dissent on the
probable outcome of any further hearing at the district court level, 251
the prospects for plaintiffs' success in overturning the ordinance seemed
quite good. But, remand to the district court would have allowed
application of the Madsen standard to a complete record, as well as the

9

244. Id. at I I 02.
245. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (I 987).
246. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2518, 2525 (1994).
247. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at I 102-03 & n.4.
248. Id. at I I 06 ("[H]ere, the court was faced with a videotape and testimony
demonstrating how the City did enforce the ordinance. The record made in the district
court indicates the City was enforcing this ordinance in a manner contrary to the
teaching of Madsen.").
249. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483. See also Vittitow, 43 F.3d at I 106.
250. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at I I 06. The Sixth Circuit was less charitable: "The City
enacted this ordinance long after the decision in Frisby was issued and should have been
well aware of the pitfalls in attempting to enforce an ordinance worded this broadly."
Id.

251. See id. at I I 09 ("As to . . . the likelihood of success on the merits, the
majority's opinion supports my view that we should affirm the district court. The
majority has reached the merits of the central questions in this case ... and has decided
that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits.").
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opportunity for the parties to present further evidence and argument, not
merely the truncated record available to the appellate court.
A.

A Paradigm For Limited Scope of Review

Because of the short time since Madsen, none of the injunction cases
currently before the appeals courts have been decided at the district court
level under the new standard of review. Yet, some possible patterns of
review may be developing that courts may use in determining what
scope of appellate review should be applied. The first issue is whether
to restrict application of a "clearly erroneous" or "abuse of discretion"
standard to federal causes of action. Implementation of FACE seemingly guarantees access to the federal courts for clinics claiming damage
from vociferous, even violent, protest, and for individuals who have been
injured, intimidated, or interfered with by protesters. 252 Pro-life groups
have challenged FACE's constitutionality in district court. However,
they have been largely unsuccessful to date. 253 It would appear that
any future challenge will face an uphill battle.
The second issue likely to be litigated is whether a particular
injunction or ordinance is content-neutral or not. If a court finds a
particular injunction to be content or viewpoint based, a strict scrutiny
standard of review applies, almost certainly dooming it. If it is contentneutral, then the Madsen standard applies. In the wake of Madsen,
federal appellate courts have applied the Madsen standard in a consistent
manner, paying close attention to the criteria laid down in the case. 254
That trend indicates the settled state of the law on that point. Only the

252. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (West 1994). Section 248(a)(l) speaks to individuals who
obtain or provide reproductive health services; § 248(a)(3) to clinics damaged by protest;
§ 248(c)(l)(A) grants a right of action for civil remedy. Id.
253. See American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995) (a threejudge panel of the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of FACE on the basis that
the Act was within the scope of Congress's commerce power; it did not violate the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause; it was not overbroad or vague; and the Act's
liquidated damages clause did not violate the First Amendment); but see United States
v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995) (federal
district court's holding the Act unconstitutional as an improper use of Congress's
commerce power overturned on appeal).
254. See, e.g., Sabelko v. City of Phoenix, 68 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. I 995); ProChoice Network of Western New York v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 1995);
National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Fischer v. City of St. Paul, 894 F. Supp. 1318, 1326-27 (D. Minn. 1995). The majority
in Vittitow also applied the Madsen rule consistently, however prematurely. See supra
text accompanying note 243. So has the one state supreme court to rule on the matter.
See Murray v. Lawson, 649 A.2d 1253 (N.J. 1994).
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advent of new and different fact patterns that do not yield to a Madsen
analysis will change that trend. 25
Furthermore, the types of government interests that the courts will find
significant also seem settled at this juncture. Vittitow and Madsen echo
the Frisby languaf.e in discussion of residential privacy and an analogous
medical privacy. 2 6 The more interesting question in each of the cases
discussed supra has been whether the particular provisions of an
ordinance or injunction in question burdens "no more speech than
necessary to serve a significant government interest" in light of a given
record. 257
In Madsen, the majority failed to uphold the buffer at the sides and
rear of the clinic property because "nothing in the record indicates that
petitioners' activities on the private property have obstructed access to
the clinic."258 The Murray v. Lawson court also commented on the
"sparse findings of the state court in Madsen" in granting the 300-foot
buffer. 259 One of Justice Scalia's major complaints was about the lack
of showing of violence and other proscribable activity around the
Madsen clinic. 260 The Sixth Circuit likewise cited the lack of support
in the record for proper enforcement in overturning the ordinance in
question, protestations of the city attorney's office not withstanding. 261
Each of these instances, as well as the more detailed analysis of the
cases supra, points towards a quintessential mixed question. Each case,
and, perforce, each record in each trial is unique. Every clinic and every
protest are differently situated. But, when viewed in light of Lee's
analysis concerning how the Supreme Court viewed various fact
finders, 262 trial courts may discern a fairly clear message for the future:
ensure that the record in any particular case errs on the side of being

255. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994).
256. Id. at 2526. See also Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1105.
257. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526.
258. Id. at 2528.
259. 649 A.2d 1253, 1264 (N.J. 1994).
260. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2535 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting that
"[a]nyone seriously interested in what this case was about must view that [video)tape.
And anyone who is familiar with run-of-the-mine labor picketing, not to mention some
other social protests, will be aghast at what it shows we have today permitted an
individual judge to do.").
261. Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d 1100, I 106-07 (6th Cir. 1995).
262. See Lee, supra note 15, at 281-84. See also supra text accompanying notes
56-85.
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fully developed and able to support very narrow tailoring and be specific
and unambiguous about the exact contours of an injunction. 263 If trial
courts exercise their discretion carefully over a period of time, then
appellate courts may become more comfortable with limiting the scope
of review even in this sensitive, First Amendment area. Protesters will
then see more prompt and certain (and more enlightened, in view of
Vittitow) enforcement of injunctions and ordinances. Tensions around
the clinics themselves may decrease along with the unwanted violence.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

This society is not likely to soon resolve the divisive question of
abortion and all of the competing rights that it encompasses. The rising
tide of violence bears testimony to the increasing rancor in the debate.
But, as Rawls so eloquently points out, we, the members of a reasonably
just society, bear a duty of civility. We also cannot condone violence.
As a society, we must search for ways to defuse the tensions and anger
that lead to violence while not infringing upon the precious, First
Amendment right to protest. The judiciary, at all levels, stands at the
center of this fine balancing act.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Frisby and Madsen provide a
framework for the courts to tailor injunctions along the limits of First
Amendment protection of the right to protest. Ensuring that protest
remains within these limits could do much to defuse the currently rising
tide of violence. Pro-life advocates might even turn to other, seemingly
more effective tactics to effect the changes in the law they desire so
much. But, endless and multiple appeals have blunted prompt and
certain enforcement of the injunctions and ordinances, robbing them of
much of their efficacy. Clearly, this was necessary while Congress and
the courts developed the law necessary to cope with the problems. That
framework would now appear largely in place.
Application of the Madsen and Frisby principles by the trial courts is
the quintessential mixed question. 264 The appellate courts have shown
discomfort in allowing a narrow scope of review in many areas of
constitutional law, but have allowed considerable discretion in others.

263. For a good example of this, see Murray, 649 A.2d at 1265 (the trial judge
knew the street where the residence in question was located because he had paid a visit
to the location).
264. The recent Second Circuit decision in Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d
377 (1995), upholding, inter alia, a floating fifteen foot buffer zone would seem to
highlight this point. As this casenote was going to press, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to this case. It will be interesting to see on what basis it reviews the case.
Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
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But, if the trial courts are careful in their application of the case law and
develop their records fully to support their findings, then the appellate
courts may allow them to exercise their discretion by promptly
upholding their findings. This will allow more prompt enforcement and
a concomitant decrease in the level of tension and violence surrounding
the clinics.
ROGER HIGGINS
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